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Indian opposition Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) activists celebrate their party's victory in elections of the western Indian state of Gujarat, at the party headquarters in New Delhi, Dec. 22.
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For the fourth time running, the Bharatiya Janata Party has vanquished its adversary in Gujarat, comprehensively beating it in every department--popular appeal, propaganda, strategy, and tactics--and establishing its supremacy in three of the four regions of the State.
Among other things, the Assembly election outcome exposed the limitations of exit polls and journalistic attempts to divine the mood of the electorate at a highly sensitive juncture in State and national politics.
But defying the odds imposed by long incumbency as well as by a falling out with sections of the party and the parivar to win 117 seats against the adversary’s 62 in a house of 182 is hardly the most significant part of the triumph of Chief Minister Narendra Modi, way and ahead India’s most controversial and divisive political figure.
He set the ideological and political terms of the contest--and the response from the Congress camp turned out to be reactive, weak, and pathetically inept. It had no answer to the Modi campaign, which did launch itself with a focus on ’development and governance’ but quickly transited to shrill and shriller communalism, the culmination of which would be a demagogic, if implicit, defence of the police killing of Sohrabuddin Sheikh in what the State government itself has admitted in the Supreme Court of India to be a fake encounter.
Thematically, 2007 was not very different from 2002.
It is well known that the Congress leaders and party organisation in Gujarat failed to make a clear, forthright, and effective stand against what happened in 2002 or, at a more general level, against aggressive Hindutva as an ideology and political mobilisation strategy.
In fact, sections of the media have taken to labelling the tamely reactive Congress stand in Gujarat as ’soft Hindutva’.
Some spirited campaign remarks aimed at ’merchants of fear and death’ by Congress president Sonia Gandhi and at Hindutva extremism and communal politics by Digvijay Singh, which ironically attracted the displeasure of the Election Commission of India, seemed to make little difference to the nature of the response.
Damagingly for the secular image of the Congress, and, as it turned out, for the credibility of its electoral politics, discredited elements of the Sangh parivar that had fallen out with Mr. Modi were allowed to join its campaign.
In Saurashtra, anti-Modi BJP rebels campaigned for the Congress, some of them even contesting on its ticket. With enemies like these, Mr. Modi was hardly in need of allies.
The Congress, which fared impressively in Gujarat in the 2004 general election--winning 12 of the 26 Lok Sabha seats and taking 91 Assembly segments against the BJP’s 89--squandered the 2007 opportunity thanks to the leadership’s failure to initiate and sustain a campaign on secularism and basic livelihood issues in a developmentally advanced State. Congress gains in central Gujarat, the epicentre of communal violence in 2002, where the BJP’s attempt to shut out normal issues seems to have failed, offered an insight into what might have been.
But they could not rescue what was, strategically as much as tactically, a botched campaign--which failed to understand that formidable campaigners and ’doers’ like Mr. Modi must be fought ideologically, in a principled and sustained manner, before they can be taken on electorally.
Whatever be the post-mortem analysis and the excuses proferred, there is no getting away from the larger political truth that Congress hopes of doing well on its own in a prospective early general election have now suffered a devastating setback.
The high-stake Assembly contest was supposed to usher in a new phase of Congress ascendancy in national politics.
A series of opinion polls seemed to motivate the party along in this direction.
That the opposite has happened is not merely demoralising for the party. It has far-going political effects in that it sends out damaging political signals to allies, potential allies, and adversaries that the party heading the central government could be in serious trouble. Journalists and political pundits have already begun speculating that, in policy terms, the Manmohan Singh government’s nuclear deal with the United States could be the first casualty.
The government has been allowed by the Left parties, upon whose support its survival depends, to go to the secretariat of the International Atomic Energy Agency and negotiate the draft of an
India-specific safeguards agreement.
This must then be brought to the UPA-Left committee, the joint mechanism looking into various aspects of the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal, for consideration. What is politically clear is that, while time may have been bought, the Left parties will not allow the deal to go beyond this first stage.
It is surely significant that it has taken the Gujarat electoral debacle for enlightenment to dawn on a Congress spokesperson, Abhishek Singhvi--who, maintaining lamely on national television that his party was keen on operationalising the nuclear deal, conceded that it would not survive the downfall of the UPA government and indeed that “death without martyrdom“ was not an attractive prospect.
With another defeat in prospect in Himachal Pradesh, the Congress will be in no hurry to face the 15th general election.
HINDU.COM