Kosovo Albanian boy looks on during a rally for an immediate declaration of independence in Pristina, Dec. 10.

One of the peculiarities of Balkan politics is how leaders have photographic memories for events that took place centuries ago, but total amnesia about what happened recently.
On the face of it, Belgrade’s offer of almost complete autonomy as long as Kosovo and the rest of the world accept Serb sovereignty seems, if somewhat dottily obsessive, eminently placatory.
But the essential claim that Kosovo is theirs because a Serb prince lost a battle to the Turks there 700 years ago, is a bit like the British claiming France because of Dunkirk.
In recent reality, the Kosovar Albanians have seen what use Serb nationalists have made of such residual claims: from Slobodan Milosevic’s dissolution of Kosovo’s autonomy and imposition of apartheid on Albanians there to his pogroms and ethnic cleansing just before the NATO intervention (which a Russian diplomat at the time described to me as “absolutely insupportable“, before in effect going on to support it).
For better or worse (frankly mostly for worse) most post-second world war dissolutions have followed established provincial or state boundaries, without too much regard for local feeling.
Those who talk about taking away the “Serbian“ areas north of Mitrovica again tend to amnesia.
Those are areas that were ethnically cleansed of Albanians in 1999 and stayed that way with the connivance of the French foreign legion who stopped Albanians going across the bridge where the bridge watchers from the Dolce Vita cafŽ waited to assault any who dared.
When I went, I had a UN press pass, so they could not stop me, but assured me that they would not lift a finger if I were assaulted.
In fact I had a good time and gave a radio interview to the local Serb station, telling them that, notwithstanding the legion, they should get used to it--UN security council resolution 1244 meant that this area was lost to Serbia.
As was clear at the time, the resolution implied eventual self-determination for Kosovo but tried to save Russian face by deciding “that a political solution to the Kosovo crisis shall be based on the general principles in annex 1 and as further elaborated in the principles and other required elements in annex 2“, which in turn referred to the Rambouillet accords.
Those accords, which incidentally precluded partition, were hazed in another level of ambiguity, promising that within three years “an international meeting“ would “determine a mechanism for a final settlement for Kosovo, on the basis of the will of the people, opinions of relevant authorities, each party’s efforts regarding the implementation of this agreement and the Helsinki final act“, which the Americans induced the KLA to sign on to by promising that it meant there would be a referendum.
After Rambouillet of course, Milosevic, assuming that with Sarajevo and Srebrenica behind him he was a modern day Achilles impenetrable to western weapons, went ahead with his ethnic cleansing and was overthrown after his defeat.
The old spiritual about Noah had a line about animals who went up two by two into the ark: “Said the ant to the elephant, ’who are you shovin’?“ It came to mind at the self-deluding bluster from Belgrade about Kosovo, where successive nationalist worthies have warned of the terrible consequences of European acceptance of Kosovar independence--Serbia may not join the EU. Brussels is doubtless quaking with fear.
Even more preposterous is the military threat. Kostunica did not disagree with Milosevic for starting wars with his neighbours but for losing them.
He has no intention of taking on the Kosovars, let alone NATO. The bellicose Serb nationalist militias would not be confronting and killing unarmed civilians this time.
Serbia and Russia are quoting the sanctity of security council resolutions.
They would have been better off reading 1244 before they signed it to save Milosevic from the ground invasion that would have finished him off immediately.
If the leaders in Belgrade, not to mention Moscow, really cared about the Serbs in Kosovo, they would stop posturing about the fig leaf of Serb sovereignty and work to ensure the maximum EU, NATO and UN presence in a Kosovo under probationary independence.
The genuine victimhood of Kosovar Albanians does not make them saints.
The best future in the region is for everyone to join the EU with its freedom of movement and shared citizenship.
Independence is going to happen, and Belgrade’s threat to cut off diplomatic relations with the rest of Europe and the USA will have somewhat less effect than a declaration of war by the Duchy of Grand Fenwick.
Ian Williams
GUARDIAN.CO.UK

An Afghan works at a poppy field in the Panjwayi district of Kandahar, April 26.

British troops have once again recaptured the less than a few square kilometers of the district headquarters of Musa Qala town in Helmand province from the Taliban, but, as before, it could turn out to be a pyrrhic victory.
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) headquarters in Kabul have heralded this week’s operations as a “most strategic and significant success“ in the province, where 80% of Afghanistan’s poppy cultivation is located.
British troops have seized Musa Qala before, but then have become virtual prisoners in their barracks. Indeed, last year they were only able to vacate the town after striking a truce with the Taliban, who controlled all the surrounding areas of the inhospitable terrain.
The Taliban put up token resistance this week, according to a Taliban commander in Kandahar, Moulvi Abdul Jalil, who told Asia Times Online on telephone that the organisation now aims to concentrate its efforts on Kandahar province and has already captured two districts near Kandahar city.
With regard to Musa Qala, Mullah Noormal (a jihadi alias), a lieutenant of Mullah Abdul Bari, said in a satellite phone interview with Asia Times Online, “They [British] fired continuous artillery shells for two days on the civilian population and as a result the people evacuated the area.“
The Taliban did not receive any casualties as we did not actually fight. Civilians were the only victims. We were under the command of Mullah Abdul Bari and retreated when the troops rolled into town.
“Now that the troops are in Musa Qala, we have taken over positions nearby, namely the towns of Raigi and Shaban. The British troops are now once again trapped, like they were in 2006. We will now retaliate at a time of our choice. They don’t have even offices to stay in Musa Qala as we destroyed the Olaswali [administrative office] before leaving the town,“ said Noormal.
“Now they are in Musa Qala’s headquarters and we are sitting in all the villages around Musa Qala. They don’t have a way forward or backwards.’’
Noormal’s comments could be taken with a pinch of salt, but they are not entirely untrue.
This correspondent spent considerable time traveling in all the districts of Helmand province under the control of the Taliban (and also those under British control. He saw the area extensively through the eyes of the Taliban late last year and through the eyes of NATO forces early this year.
Beyond Greskh district, on the way to Musa Qala, there is no road network. Vehicles have to travel on wide deserted plains, following the tire marks of other vehicles.
The average speed is less than 10 kilometers an hour. The approach to Musa Qala is marked by agriculture fields and trees. The town itself comprises some shops, a hospital, a few mosques and inns and the district headquarters.
It is clear that NATO is obsessed with Helmand province in order to complete the renovation of Kajaki Dam, a hydroelectric project that will ensure uninterrupted power supply to Kandahar and Helmand provinces.
This is strategically significant for a backward region where roads do not exist and the people still rely on natural rain water reservoirs.
The bumper poppy crops in Helmand that make their way through Pakistan to Europe earn the Taliban huge dividends to fuel their war against NATO. And the smuggling routes are reliable supply lines for arms and human resources to flow into Afghanistan.
From the province’s southern district of Gramsir, bordering Pakistan, to the northern end of Baghran, large areas are partially or completely under Taliban control. Partial control means that district headquarters are under the control of the Kabul administration and all surrounding villages are under the control of the Taliban.
British authorities in Helmand confirm that poppy cultivation takes place across the province. Drug-processing labs are mostly in Taliban-controlled Sangin district, north of Gramsir.
The trafficking routes pass through the government-controlled provincial capital of Lashkargah, between those two districts, with the connivance of Afghan security before going on through Taliban areas to Pakistan. Using exactly the same route via Pakistan, arms are smuggled into Helmand then spread all over Afghanistan.
ATIMES.COM

Sixty years after its invention as an imagined national community whose membership was defined by religious affiliation, Pakistan is a deeply fractured and bitterly divided society, beset with enormous political and security problems.
President Pervez Musharraf’s desire to maintain political power at all costs has undermined the military’s image and dangerously threatened prospects for stability in the country.
As is the case with most dictators, Musharraf started as a decent man but soon fell prey to his own ambition, convincing himself that he was Pakistan’s indispensable man, a national hero who transformed the country from a rogue state into a crucial Muslim ally of the United States.
Musharraf likes to brag about his eight-year tenure in office, especially when compared to the record of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, two former prime ministers with tainted reputations.
Since he seized power in a military coup in 1999, the economy has expanded, foreign exchange reserves have shot up from less than $1 billion to $16 billion, and the stock exchange index has seen its value rise 13-fold.
But Musharraf’s obsession with power and miscalculations cost him his credibility. Since his botched bid to fire the country’s chief justice, Iftikhar Mohammed Chaudhury, his popularity and political capital
among Pakistanis
slid dramatically.
His approval rating has gone from 63 percent in 2006 to 21 percent, according to a survey released by the International Republican Institute in early October 2007.
Approximately three-quarters of those polled opposed Musharraf’s re-election as president and about the same number thought that the country was on the wrong track.
The survey also confirmed what many other polls have repeatedly shown: The alternative to military rule in Pakistan is not the Taliban-like zealots.
In a free and fair election, 64 percent of Pakistanis will vote for the two main moderate opposition parties, while 31 percent of the vote will be divided almost equally between Musharraf’s Muslim League and all other religious parties combined.
Today, the only thing that unites this country of 167 million people is Pakistanis’ wish to see an immediate a-politicization of the army and its return to the barracks. This wish, however, might be unattainable despite Musharraf’s decision to quit as army chief.
Under Musharraf’s rule, the army has become an omnivorous business empire, controlling as much as one-third of all heavy manufacturing, 7 percent of private assets, and 4.8 million hectares of public land.
Musharraf and his military comrades, who harbor deep disdain for civilian authority, attribute this massive control of assets to the efficiency and competence of military personnel.
The military claims that its control of thousands of public organizations and businesses like banks, insurance companies, fertilizer plants, bakeries and universities is beneficial for the economy.
“Why is anyone jealous if the retired military officers or the civilians with them are doing a good job contributing to the economy?“ Musharraf once said.
In reality, however, the Pakistani military thrives thanks to lavish government subsidies and bailouts for military-run businesses, which stifle competition and business.
DAILYSTAR.CO.PK