Lebanese Red Cross rescuers gather at the site of a car bomb attack that killed a Lebanese army general in Baabda, Dec. 12.

The assassination of General Francois al-Hajj strikes at the last remaining symbol of unity in this country, the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF).
For years the military has been more successful than other institutions in limiting and even reversing the corrosive effects of sectarianism, so any attack on it is also an assault on national spirit and a blow to progressive policies.
In addition, the killing threatens to compromise the LAF’s essential role as a bulwark guarding against clashes between supporters of rival political camps.
For all these reasons and many more, the murder of al-Hajj figures to complicate the challenges facing the LAF’s commander, General Michel Suleiman, whether or not he eventually emerges as the country’s next president.
Luckily, the very reasons that make the military such an important target also make it a tough one.
A concerted effort has been made to keep the LAF above the political wrangling that poisons so much else in Lebanon, making it less susceptible to attempts at sowing division.
There is little reason for panic, therefore, or even for serious concern that an incident like al-Hajj’s assassination might cause the military to lose a significant amount of either its internal cohesion or the confidence it inspires in many sectors of society.
This last point was made clear by the individual reactions of most Lebanese political leaders and their parties.
The great majority of these condemned the hit on al-Hajj and refrained from the sorts of accusations and counter-accusations that have accompanied similar attacks in the past.
There were key exceptions: MP Michel Aoun, leader of the opposition Reform and Change bloc, insinuated that the governement of Premier Fouad Siniora bore responsibility for the killing; and former President Amin Gemayel, whose Phalange Party is part of the majority, made a thinly veiled accusation against the opposition.
At least initially, though, they were the only major figures who rushed to judgment: The rest were known cranks of one stripe or another.
Each of the multiple shocks that have rocked Lebanon over the past year or so has fueled talk of a precipice on whose edge the country can only teeter for so long before it tumbles over into chaos.
Conversely, some of the more dangerous incidents have been touted as potential catalysts for a widespread realization of the need for an end to the impasse.
If some form of discipline can be maintained among the ranks of both camps, this might be the occasion that convinces both of them of the urgent need for them to settle their differences.
DAILYSTAR.COM.LB

Inspiration, too, requires the threat of effective military power to be an effective force for change. Notwithstanding its many setbacks in recent years, the US remains the only power capable of leading a global strategy that consists in balancing soft and hard power.
With President George W Bush’s grand strategy for the Middle East in ruins, his administration has, however hesitantly, begun to put greater emphasis on resolving conflicts by peaceful means.
The settlement reached with North Korea, whereby it will dismantle its nuclear programme, and the Annapolis conference for an Israeli-Palestinian peace--with the participation of Syria--are two key examples of this trend.
The United States’ staunchest ally since 2001, Great Britain, has already gone down this path, divorcing itself from its servile alliance with a Bush administration that focused on war
and confrontation.
Though only a miniature version of America’s imperial predicament, Britain’s current policy, as its new Prime Minister Gordon Brown is defining it, may anticipate the direction taken by the next American president.
Tony Blair’s endorsement of Bush’s Middle East designs showed that an imbalance of power in an alliance always causes the weaker partner to become subservient.
Britain joined America’s Iraq adventure with the same inflated perceptions of its military capacity and diplomatic clout that trapped Bush, but Britain’s military contribution to the war effort was not indispensable, so Bush did not have to heed Blair’s advice.
As a result, Britain could not serve as a bridge between a doubtful Europe and a belligerent US, as Blair believed, and Britain’s capacity to be a force for good on the world stage was severely damaged.
Like America, Britain has learned the hard way the limits of what sheer military power can achieve.
The scope and virulence of anti-British sentiment in the Muslim World are now second only to that facing the US. Restoring Britain’s reputation in the region will take years of hard work.
Blair’s legacy has thrown Brown into a confusing oscillation between Britain’s transatlantic tradition and its European connections.
No longer an independent global power, yet unhappy with the London-Washington axis that Blair forged, Brown’s government continues to waffle in its commitment to a united Europe. Indeed, Brown, for whom America remains “Britain’s most important bilateral relationship“, recently blocked his foreign secretary, David Miliband, from delivering a speech that he considered excessively pro-Europe.
But such uncertainty, common in times of transition, should not overshadow what the end of the Blair-Bush era in Britain holds in store. Unilateralism and pre-emptive wars are to be replaced by what Brown defines as “an agenda for a hard-headed internationalism“, based on cooperation with multilateral agencies and alliances--the United Nations, NATO, the European Union, and the British Commonwealth.
The new policy seems to shift emphasis to “soft power“ strategy aimed at projecting Britain as a global economic and cultural hub.
The City of London, the British Council, Oxfam, and the BBC are now expected to restore the prominence of Britain’s enduring values.
Conspicuously, it is no longer the British, but France’s government under President Nicolas Sarkozy, that is carrying the torch of a possible attack on Iran’s nuclear installations.
But, for Brown’s policy to succeed, it must promote social change and political reform in the Arab world.
The “extremists“ versus “moderates“ language has served only to revive colonial memories in the region and divide it even more deeply. Post-Blair Britain is becoming a country for which wars that lack international legitimacy can only presage defeat and moral decay.
Of course, international legitimacy can be a vacuous concept when not backed by the capacity to use effective force. Now incapable of intimidating anyone, the UK has opted for developing its potential to inspire.
Unfortunately, inspiration, too, requires the threat of effective military power to be an effective force for change. Notwithstanding its many setbacks in recent years, the US remains the only power capable of leading a global strategy that consists in balancing soft and hard power.
May the next American president pursue this course.
DAILYTIMES.COM.PK

Supporters of Spanish dictator, Francisco Franco, give a fascist salute during a demonstration to commemorate the 32th anniversary of his death in Madrid's Oriente Square, Nov. 18.

In October, the Spanish Parliament passed a Law on Historical Memory, which bans rallies and memorials celebrating the former dictator Francisco Franco.
His Falangist regime will be officially denounced and its victims honored.
There are plausible reasons for enacting such a law.
Many people killed by the Fascists during the Spanish Civil War lie unremembered in mass graves.
There is still a certain degree of nostalgia on the far right for Franco’s dictatorship. People gathered at his tomb earlier this year chanted “We won the Civil War!,“ while denouncing socialists and foreigners.
Reason enough, one might think, for Socialist Prime Minister Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero to use the law to exorcize the demons of dictatorship for the sake of democracy’s good health.
But legislation is a blunt instrument for dealing with history. While historical discussion won’t be out of bounds in Spain, even banning ceremonies celebrating bygone days may go a step too far.
The desire to control both past and present is, of course, a common feature of dictatorships.
This can be done through false propaganda, distorting the truth, or suppressing the facts. Anyone in China who mentions what happened on Tiananmen Square (and many other places) in June 1989 will soon find himself in the less-than-tender embrace of the State Security Police.
Indeed, much of what happened under Chairman Mao Zedong remains taboo.
Spain, however, is a democracy.
Sometimes the wounds of the past are so fresh that even democratic governments deliberately impose silence in order to foster unity.
When Charles de Gaulle revived the French Republic after World War II, he ignored the history of Vichy France and Nazi collaboration by pretending that all French citizens had been good republican patriots.
More truthful accounts, such as Marcel Ophuls’ magisterial documentary “The Sorrow and the Pity“ (1968) were, to say the least, unwelcome.
Ophuls’ film was not shown on French state television until 1981. After Franco’s death in 1975, Spain, too, treated its recent history with remarkable discretion.
Children of Franco’s victims are making up for their parents’ silence. Suddenly, the Civil War is everywhere, in books, television shows, movies, academic seminars, and now in the legislature, too.
This is not only a European phenomenon. Nor is it a sign of creeping authoritarianism. On the contrary, it often comes with more democracy.
When South Korea was ruled by military strongmen, Korean collaboration with Japanese colonial rule in the first half of the 20th century was not discussed--partly because some of those strongmen, notably the late Park Chung Hee, had been collaborators themselves.
Now, under President Roh Moo Hyun, a new Truth and Reconciliation Law has not only stimulated a thorough airing of historical grievances, but has also led to a hunt for past collaborators.
Lists have been drawn up of people who played a significant role in the Japanese colonial regime, ranging from university professors to police chiefs--and extending even to their children, reflecting the Confucian belief that families are responsible for the behavior of their individual members.
The fact that many family members, including Park Chung Hee’s daughter, Geon Hye, support the conservative opposition party is surely no coincidence.
JAPANTIMES.COM