General Pervez Ashfaq Kiyani

General Pervez Ashfaq Kiyani’s emergence as Pakistan Army’s Chief of Army Staff is no run-of-the-mill elevation. It comes at a crucial stage of Pakistan’s political future. Ê
The contextual setting as emerging in Pakistan today needs a recall:Ê
* General Musharraf’s eight years of military rule has deeply divided and polarized Pakistan, politically and comprehensively.
* Pakistan’s civil society and the vast masses of Pakistan’s 160 million population suffer from “military rule“ fatigue.
* Prevalent public mood in Pakistan is for “military regime change“ and restoration of democracy.
* Pakistan Army’s public image has taken a severe beating in Pakistan lately
* Pakistan Army’s morale is low and it has fared miserably against the tribal insurgency onslaught on the Western frontiers.
Pakistan therefore virtually stands as a “failed state“ where a “garrison governance“ is brutally imposed to further the political and financial interests of “Pakistan Military Incorporated“ and its hierarchy.Ê

Convergence of InterestsÊ
While professional competence may be his forte, it is the strong convergence of interests of General Musharraf, Benazir Bhutto and the United States that strongly facilitated his emergence as Pakistan Army’s Chief of Army Staff.Ê
It can also be stated that though the seniority principle emerged as a coincidence in General Kiyani’s favor, he would have still been elevated as Chief of Army Staff as he is a critical component of the United States scripted comprehensive plan to perpetuate Musharraf in power with civilian credentials by shedding the Army Chief’s appointment to his loyal aide and America’s trusted and approved General.Ê
While the United States-Musharraf plan was well known for some time, but what emerged was a report of Benazir Bhutto’s insistence on General Kiyani’s appointment.Ê
It is being said in Pakistan that Benazir Bhutto had insisted in the ’Deal’ discussed with General Musharraf that he had to approve General Kiyani as a “Consented Chief“ of hers as part of the overall “Deal“. The future Chief had to be someone she could trust. Ê
The bio-data of General Kiyani released officially indicates that he was the Deputy Military Secretary of Benazir Bhutto in her first tenure as Prime Minister in the 1980s.Ê
General Kiyani was also actively involved lately on behalf of General Musharraf in discussions of the Deal with Benazir Bhutto in Dubai.Ê He therefore emerges as a vital link in the parleys of General Musharraf with Benazir Bhutto both of his earlier links with her as Prime Minister and now as DG ISI under General Musharraf.Ê

Domestic Implications
In Pakistan, surfing through viewers comments in the media and blog-sites what emerges strongly is that there is an over-riding “anti-United States“ sentiment presently persisting in Pakistan. ÊThe latest resentment focuses on United States perpetuation of the Musharraf regime.Ê
With his being the United States preferred choice, General Musharraf’s loyalist and a “consented Pak Army Chief“ of Benazir Bhutto, it will be hard for General Kiyani to de-link himself from the pro-American labels of Musharraf and Bhutto.Ê

Role of PoliticsÊ
General Kiyani’s performance as Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff has to be viewed from three angles.Ê The first angle being his functioning solely as Chief of Army Staff and focusing his energies and professional competence to re-build the Pakistan Army as a professional force.Ê
The second angle is whether General Kiyani can function as an “apolitical Chief“ without getting drawn in Pakistan’s political turmoil.Ê The third angle is whether General Kiyani as United States preferred choice could deliver to the United States all that the Americans expect of him on the global war on terrorism front.Ê
Solely on the professional front, General Kiyani would face the following challenges (1) Rebuild Pakistan Army’s professional competence (2) Restore Pakistan Army’s low morale (3) Restore Pakistan Army’s grip over the insurgency challenges on its Western frontiers (4) Reclaim Pakistan’s Army’s poor image in Pakistani public opinion.
While General Kiyani seems to be well equipped in terms of professional competences to deal with these challenges, a lot would depend on how much his personal attention will be diverted by the ongoing Pakistani political turmoil and polarization.Ê
General Kiyani’s emergence as Army Chief has not been an “apolitical“ one.Ê Politics has played a strong part especially in terms of the expectations that General Musharraf, Benazir Bhutto as a prospective Prime Minister (by Army’s pardon) and the United States have from him.Ê
General Musharraf’s contrived emergence as a civilian President is unlikely to stem the worsening political turmoil in Pakistan.Ê Musharraf is likely to be violently contested even after becoming a civilian President.Ê In such a situation General Musharraf would have a call on General Kiyani to protect the President’s turf. ÊGeneral Kiyani’s responses perforce will have to be political.Ê Either he will have to re-use the Pakistan Army as an instrument of political suppression or replace General Musharraf as President himself.Ê Both courses are well within the realms of possibility.
SAAG.ORGÊ

He who fights with monsters might take care lest he thereby become a monster,“ Nietzsche said. “And if you gaze for long into an abyss, the abyss gazes also into you.“
We’re gazing into the abyss all right, and Blackwater is gazing back.
Besides having an army for hire, brave kids who are paid to fight so that most Americans are not personally touched by war, we have the real mercenaries. And they’re a spooky cadre, careening outside the laws of Iraq, the United States and the military.
President Bush continues to preach that we must defeat the “dark ideology“ of extremists with “a more hopeful vision.“
But the compromises W. makes to slog on in Iraq, be it with warlords, dictators or out-of-control contractors, are spreading a dark stain on America’s image.
“Blackwater appears to have fostered a culture of shoot first and sometimes kill, and then ask the questions,“ said Representative Elijah Cummings, a Democrat, yesterday at a House hearing.
The Times reports that Blackwater’s explanation of an incident in Baghdad on Sept. 16 that left 17 dead and 24 wounded is sketchy.
It seems as though a bullet struck an Iraqi man driving his mother to pick up his father, a pathologist, at the hospital. The dead man’s weight, The Times reports, “probably remained on the accelerator and propelled the car forward“ toward a Blackwater convoy.
Blackwater guards then unleashed a spray of gunfire and explosives, even though witnesses did not see anyone shooting at the American convoy and even though Iraqis were turning their cars around and escaping the scene.
Newsweek quotes the Iraqi national police as saying that Blackwater vehicles “opened fire crazily and randomly, without any reason.“
The Blackwater desperados are a sinister symbol of how little progress we’ve made in Iraq, that V.I.P.’s can’t make a move in the country without the high-priced hired guns of the State Department.
Americans have been antimercenary since the British sent 30,000 German Hessians after George Washington in the Revolutionary War.
But W. outsourced his presidency to Cheney and Rummy, and Cheney and Rummy went to war on the cheap and outsourced large chunks of the Iraq occupation to Halliburton and Blackwater. The American taxpayer got gouged, and so did the American reputation.
The mercenaries inflame Iraqis even as Gen. David Petraeus tries to win their trust.
Henry Waxman, the chairman of the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, summoned the 38-year-old crew-cut chairman of Blackwater, Erik Prince, to defend his private security company on Oct. 2.
Once there was the military-industrial complex. Now we have the mercenary-evangelical complex.
Blackwater, in turn, has been the beneficiary of $1 billion in federal contracts, including a no-bid contract with the State Department worth hundreds of millions.
Mr. Waxman on Oct. 2 called the State Department “Blackwater’s enabler.“ His committee staff summarized State Department reports revealing a cascade of Blackwater trouble.
“In a high-profile incident in December 2006, a drunken Blackwater contractor killed the guard of Iraqi Vice President Adil Abdul Mahdi. Within 36 hours after the shooting, the State Department had allowed Blackwater to transport the Blackwater contractor out of Iraq.“
The State Department chargŽ d’affaires “suggested a $250,000 payment to the guard’s family, but the Department’s Diplomatic Security Service said this was too much and could cause Iraqis to ’try to get killed.’ “ In the end, they agreed on a $15,000 payment.
NYTIMES.COM

Lebanon’s tussling factions are headed for a stalemate, settlement, or war, and international actors as much as local ones will decide which, analysts say.
The presidential vote that was to be held on Sept. 25 was deferred until Oct. 23 after lawmakers failed to find a consensus candidate.
Opposition members of parliament boycotted the vote, arguing that Lebanon’s fragile sectarian political system requires a president agreeable to both camps.
A two-month period of horse-trading is permitted by the constitution and analysts say that in Lebanon the immediate election of a president is historically rare. However, by Nov. 23, M.P.’s must choose a successor to President Emile Lahoud, whose extension by a Syrian-influenced constitutional amendment three years ago plunged Lebanon into chaos.
The United Nations Security Council urged Lebanon on Sept. 27 to elect the president freely, fairly, and on time.
Since last summer’s war between Israel and the armed wing of Hezbollah--widely accepted as a strategic defeat for Israel--the international spotlight has shone on Hezbollah’s weapons.
After the 1975-1990 civil war, Hezbollah was the only militia to retain its arms by Lebanese consensus, forming what was called the “national resistance“ to Israel’s continued occupation of south Lebanon. Israeli troops withdrew from the south in 2000 after a 22-year occupation and a war of attrition with Hezbollah fighters.
The conflict that has cleaved Lebanon in two since Lahoud’s extension and the assassination in February 2005 of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, which Washington and its Lebanese allies blamed on Syria, boiled over after last summer’s war.
Though the government had confirmed Hezbollah’s “right“ to “liberate“ an Israeli-occupied border pocket, the Shebaa Farms, in July 2005’s National Dialogue sessions, on Aug. 13, 2006, cabinet members called for a session to discuss disarming Hezbollah.
That drew a furious response from Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, who accused Siniora of being a “traitor“ and of working to an American and Israeli agenda.
The dispute escalated and last November all Shia ministers and one allied Christian resigned from the government.
“What does the United States want with Lebanon’s elections? A candidate who would serve their agenda, which is neutralizing the resistance,“ said Amal Saad Ghorayeb, an expert on Hezbollah at the Carnegie Endowment’s Middle East Center in Beirut.
The United Nations is also watching Lebanon closely.
The U.N. Interim Forces in Lebanon (UNIFIL) have around 13,000 peacekeepers stationed in south Lebanon and along the border with Israel, an area formerly tightly controlled by Hezbollah.
UNIFIL have received a number of threats from what many analysts believe are Sunni militants working to an Al Qaeda ideology. In June, six U.N. peacekeepers were killed by a roadside bomb while on a routine patrol in the Khiam area.
The United Nations is also involved in establishing an international tribunal to try suspects in Hariri’s assassination.
The assassination earlier this month of the fourth anti-Syrian politician since the Hariri bombing, which also killed Economy Minister Bassel Fleihan, has been added to the U.N. probe’s caseload.
The government accuses Syria of masterminding those assassinations and says Damascus wants to regain the dominance of its smaller neighbor by levering an ally into the presidential seat.
“Lebanon is very much a priority for the U.N.,“ Safa said. “It is definitely afraid of the deteriorating security situation.“
WORLDPRESS.ORG

On October 21, 2005, the Second Artillery Corps of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) opened its doors for the first time to foreign guests. Donald Rumsfeld, then secretary of defense, and Peter Rodman, who at the time was serving as US assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, traveled to the not-so-secret Second Artillery headquarters in Qinghe, just north of Beijing, to meet with the commander of China’s strategic missile forces, General Jing Zhiyuan.
The visit consisted of a PowerPoint presentation on the service arm’s command structure and missile forces training as well as a post-briefing discussion between Rumsfeld and Jing on nuclear doctrine.
During the exchange, General Jing reaffirmed the centrality of the “no first use“ principle to China’s nuclear doctrine, which helped to offset some of the growing concern in US circles over PLA General Zhu Chenghu’s comments in Hong Kong three months earlier.
Zhu, a dean at the National Defense University, told reporters that “if the Americans draw their missiles and precision-guided ammunitions onto the target zone on China’s territory, I think we will have to respond with nuclear weapons“.
Jing Zhiyuan’s constructive approach to talks with his US guests, as well as his assertion that his seat on the Central Military Commission (CMC) puts him “in a position to clarify the issue“ of Chinese nuclear doctrine, left a favorable enough impression on Rumsfeld and Rodman for them to conclude that General Jing was the type of figure who could serve as a valuable conduit for military-to-military exchanges between China and the United States.
President George W Bush hoped to keep the momentum running in April 2006 by extending a formal invitation to President Hu Jintao for General Jing to visit the US Strategic Command at Offutt Air Force Base near Omaha, Nebraska, in the midwestern US.
The idea was to continue the discussions on nuclear doctrine, strategy, and operations that had begun in Beijing six months earlier. Nearly a year and a half after Hu accepted the US invitation, however, Jing has yet to meet with his counterpart, General James Cartwright, and no date had been set for a visit. As preparations intensify for the upcoming 17th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, General Jing will likely further postpone his visit.
In light of US efforts to foster transparency and avoid the kind of misperceptions that can, and have, exacerbated tensions in the bilateral security relationship, General Jing, a member of the CMC with long experience in the PLA’s strategic missile forces, is an important part of the senior military mix in Beijing. Jing also stands out among his general colleagues because the Second Artillery Corps is at the heart of current PLA modernization efforts. Continued direct contact would provide an important opportunity to build personal relationships between US and Chinese military officers at the most senior level. It may also create a new information channel through which the Pentagon hopes to gain a better understanding of China’s strategic missile forces and perhaps even to influence the perceptions of the top Second Artillery Corps leadership.
While information on Jing Zhiyuan is sparse, the available facts regarding his training and professional experience indicate a background steeped in the missile-related issues that most concern the US Department of Defense. Jing began his career in the PLA as an artillery soldier in 1963.
Following a series of promotions, he was appointed to command the Second Artillery Base 56 in Xining, Qinghai Province.
His stint in Qinghai provided direct exposure to strategic missile systems and their associated operational procedures. Among other missile types, Base 56 is home to China’s primary regional missile system, the DF-3A, a medium-range ballistic missile with a range of 3,000 to 4,000 kilometers. Two of Base 56’s affiliated brigades--Delingha and Da Qaidam--are equipped with DF-4 missiles, the first Chinese ballistic missile type to possess limited intercontinental ability.
At 4,750 km, the range of the DF-4 allows China to target cities and military facilities throughout the Asia-Pacific and as far away as Alaska.
ATIMES.COM

Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda made his first policy speech in the Diet. Although Mr. Fukuda’s speech lacked freshness and bold proposals, it shows that he correctly grasps what worries people have about today’s politics.
But the question is whether he will come up with concrete policy measures and find sufficient funds to solve problems and whether he can get cooperation from the opposition camp, which now controls the Upper House following the July 29 election.
Mr. Fukuda declared that his administration will sincerely pursue dialogue with the opposition camp on important policy matters.
This shows his intention of trying to get things done as peacefully as possible in the Diet by acting with sincerity toward the opposition camp. This is a welcome change from the Abe administration, which successively forced important bills through the Diet.
As expected, Mr. Fukuda cites as “pressing issues“ the continuation of the Maritime Self-Defense Force’s refueling activities in the Indian Ocean for the U.S.-led antiterrorism mission and the early resolution of the North Korean problem, including the past abduction of Japanese nationals.
Displaying his dialogue-oriented approach, he said he will do his best to explain the MSDF’s activities to the people and the Diet so that he can gain their understanding. It is hoped that he will disclose sufficient information to give a clear picture of the MSDF’s activities.
Mr. Fukuda called the abduction issue a “serious human rights issue,“ but indicated that he will pursue a dialogue-oriented approach with North Korea. He said he will make utmost efforts to normalize relations with North Korea by coming to terms with the past--meaning by atoning for Japan’s 1910-45 colonial rule of Korean Peninsula. It remains to be seen whether his approach can break the recent impasse.
Calling the alliance between Japan and the United States the cornerstone of Japan’s diplomacy, Mr. Fukuda said he will strive to strengthen trustful relations between the two countries while, at the same time, pushing a “proactive Asia diplomacy,“ especially with China and South Korea, so that the strengthening of the Japan-U.S. alliance will “resonate with“ diplomatic efforts in Asia.
Mr. Fukuda said Japan and China will jointly contribute to peace and stability in Asia by establishing mutually beneficial relations based on common strategic interests--a constructive approach compared with Mr. Abe’s, which appeared more inclined toward containing China by forming close ties among Japan, the U.S., Australia and India.
JAPANTIMES.COM